Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC Docket No. 25-966 Argued: 11/10/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Cert Granted: 4/27/26 Question Presented The H–2A visa program grants U.S. employers the privilege of “import[ing]” foreign aliens into the United States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers’ living and working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure employer compliance with those “terms and conditions.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). The question presented is: Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary remedies from employers who violate the terms and conditions of participati
Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. Docket No. 25-159 Argued: 11/9/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Cert Granted: 6/29/26 Question Presented The Natural Gas Act authorizes private companies to condemn land in order to build certain naturalgas infrastructure, but it says nothing about how to determine the amount of just compensation owed for the property taken. 15 U.S.C. § 717f. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that compensation awards in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act must therefore be determined by reference to state law, which often mandates higher compensation than the floor set by the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the Eighth Circuit expressly split with its sister circuits and instead held that the Natural Gas Act permits only the constitutional minimum of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question presented is: In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation
Nielsen v. Watanabe Docket No. 25-417 Argued: 11/9/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Cert Granted: 6/22/26 Question Presented This case concerns the judicially created damages remedy first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court extended Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison officials failed to address an inmate’s acute asthma attack and exacerbated it, causing his death on-site within hours. Since then, this Court has emphasized that the creation of damages actions rests with Congress, not courts. The judicially created Bivens remedy thus cannot be extended to any “new Bivens context” if any “special factor counsel[s] hesitation” in doing so. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139-140 (2017). “[T]he new-context inquiry is easily satisfied,” encompassing cases with “‘meaningful[ly]’” different fact
Guerrero v. Johnson Docket No. 25-1003 Argued: 11/4/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Cert Granted: 6/15/26 Question Presented The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applications by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, including for claims that “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language allows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2255(h)(2). The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on “a new rule . . . that was previously unavailable” when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have succeeded. T
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy Docket No. 25-581 Argued: 11/3/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Cert Granted: 4/20/26 Question Presented Colorado’s so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an “equal opportunity” to enroll regardless of, inter alia, race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only “children of color,” “gender-nonconforming children,” “the LGBTQ community,” low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gender. The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s decision to exclude Catholic preschools
Maxwell v. Dinis Docket No. 25-5930 Argued: 11/2/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Cert Granted: 6/1/26 Question Presented FOR REVIEW In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3620(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The Warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief. Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit. Sua sponte, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court's decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 216 L.E
Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office Docket No. 25-352 Argued: 11/2/26 Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Cert Granted: 3/30/26 Question Presented Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “must” plead “any” affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)? PARTIES The parties are Dr. Jasmine Younge and the Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia. DIRECTLY RELATED CASES Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia, No. 23-11418, United State Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, judgment