Most disasters start long before the explosion - years earlier, inside the organisations and systems designed to prevent them. In this episode, I unpack Nick Pidgeon and Michael O'Leary's excellent article 'Man-Made Disasters: Why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail', which expands Barry Turner's classic Man-Made Disaster theory. I cover: a) disaster incubation - how vulnerability quietly grows for years b) various concepts like rigidities of belief, decoy phenomena & the variable disjunction of information c) systemic uncertainty - when we can't even 'see' a hazard right in front of us d) safety imagination and the challenge of proceduralising to safety e) safety subcultures as both a resource for navigating risk but also blinding us to it Main ref: Pidgeon, N., & O’Leary, M. (2000). Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Science, 34(1–3), 15–30. Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson
Is your injury rate telling you next to nothing about fatality risk?For years, 'safety' has been measured by counting what went wrong - e.g. recordables, TRIFR, LTIFR. But serious injuries and fatalities, or SIFS, haven't followed the same consistent downward trend. This raises the question: are we measuring the 'wrong' thing? This video unpacks a 2026 study from Bayona, Hallowell and others who analysed 999 field assessments from 31 utility & construction companies, testing whether two short-term measures predicted serious harm potential. The measures were:a) Pre-job safety brief (PJSB) quality: evaluating the engagement and thoroughness of pre-task discussionsb) High-energy control assessment (HECA): the proportion of high-energy hazards with a direct control in place. They found:1) Companies with better pre-job briefs tended towards better energy controls2) Each 1-point increase in HECA was associated with ~3% fewer expected SIFsThey also found that better pre-job briefs were linked